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The Sky's the Limit? The Emergence
of Building Trademarks
I. Introduction
"The sky's the limit" is an old cliche that usually signified the
ability to be or obtain whatever one wanted. The phrase takes on
a whole new meaning when viewed in terms of present trademark
law. Building trademarks have become one of the hottest fields in
intellectual property law.' Currently, many owners of prominent
building landmarks are applying for or have obtained trademarks.'
The trademarking of buildings can have serious ramifications
for manufacturers and producers of tourist items, as well as the
movie industry.3  Use of the trademarked building without
permission could lead to a lawsuit. Postcards of the building alone
or in the skyline, small replicas of the building or a quick view of
the building in a movie could all be infringing uses.4
Recently, two famous New York landmarks, the Chrysler
Building and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), have been
the subject of building trademark disputes.' Currently, only the
spire of the Chrysler Building is trademarked.6 However, the
present owners of the Chrysler Building have applied for a
trademark of the entire building with possible use of the trademark
on more than 400 goods and services.'
1. See Joseph R. Dreitler, Is 6th Circuit Off Key?, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 18,
1998, at C25.
2. See David Kirkpatrick, No T-shirts! Lofty Towers Trademark Images, WALL ST. J.
EUR., June 12, 1998, at 11 (trademarked buildings include Donald Trump's buildings,
Transamerica Pyramid, Wrigley Building, Citicorp Center and Guggenheim Museum); David
W. Dunlap, The Skyline is Protected // Architecture: Landlords Get Picky About Use of
Famous Buildings, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Sept. 7, 1998, at El [hereinafter Dunlap,
The Skyline] (buildings considering applying for trademarks include Rockefeller Center,
Radio City Music Hall, Flatiron Building and Grand Central Terminal).
3. See David Usborne, New York Patents Skyline View, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Sept.
3, 1998, at 15; Dunlap, The Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
5. See David Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 11; Dunlap, The Skyline, supra note 2, at
El.
6. See Trademark Registration No. 1126888, Registration Date Nov. 20, 1979.
7. See Dunlap, The Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
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The building trademark dispute regarding the Chrysler
Building began when the owners of the building sent a cease and
desist letter to Fishs Eddy, distributor of a china pattern with the
New York skyline as a border.8 The Chrysler Building owners
claimed that the use of the building in the skyline without permis-
sion was an infringement of the Chrysler Building trademark.9
Owners of the Chrysler Building claim their trademark protects the
image of the building as providing high-quality rental space.10
Additionally, the owners of the Chrysler Building anticipate that
enforcement of their trademark rights will uphold the integrity of
the building."
If the Chrysler Building owners succeed in such an action, the
ramifications experienced in the New York tourist industry would
be unprecedented. Any producer or distributor of products that
include the Chrysler Building could be precluded from using the
building in their products. Postcards of the building or skyline with
the building could no longer be produced without Chrysler's
permission, essentially giving owners of a trademarked building the
right to control the reproduction of the skyline.
The second building trademark dispute arose with the opening
of "New York New York," a new Las Vegas Casino, which
prompted the NYSE to file a lawsuit." The NYSE has a regis-
tered trademark which consists of the words "New York Stock
Exchange" and the building facade." "New York New York," the
new Las Vegas casino, features replicas of some of New York's
best-known landmarks. t4 Included among the landmarks is the
facade of the NYSE.1 5  A sign above the "one-armed bandits"
welcomes patrons to the "New York $lot Exchange.,
16
8. See Usborne, supra note 3, at 15; David W. Dunlap, What Next? A Fee For
Looking?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1998, at F5 [hereinafter Dunlap, What Next?]; Dunlap, The
Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
9. See sources cited supra note 8.
10. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 11; Usborne, supra note 3, at 15.
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
12. See New York Stock Exchange v. New York New York Hotel LLC, No. 97CV2859
(S.D.N.Y. filed April 21, 1997). See also Exchange of Views, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at
13; Casino's Wall Street Draws Lawsuit, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 26, 1997, at 3.
13. See Trademark Registration Number 1761655, dated March 30, 1993.
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The NYSE was not impressed with the creativity of the "New
York New York" Casino designers.17 The lawsuit charges the
Casino with "mutilating and bastardizing" the appearance of the
NYSE trademark. 8 The suit alleges that the casino's use of the
NYSE trademark infringes and dilutes the trademark causing
damage to the reputation and good will of the NYSE."
This comment focuses on the burgeoning field of building
trademark protection, with emphasis on the Chrysler Building and
NYSE issues. Part II discusses an applicable law for building
trademarks. Parts III and IV provide an interpretation and
synthesis of case law to show how buildings may be protected by
Federal trademark law. Part V analyzes the effect of law and
precedent on the current NYSE and Chrysler Building issues and
concludes that both the NYSE and Chrysler may have a cause of
action under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. Part VI
discusses the ramifications of trademark protection for buildings.
II. Applicable Law
A. Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, provides federal infringe-
ment protection for trademarks." Injunctive relief is granted
when the trademark owner shows that the defendant's use of a
similar mark causes or would cause consumer confusion as to the
source of the trademarked goods.21 Prior to the passage of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), trademark
protection under the Lanham Act only extended to protect
trademarks from consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship
of the same or similar goods and services.22 Twenty-six states
expanded in-state trademark protection beyond federal protection.
17. See Exchange of Views, supra note 12, at 13; NYSE Tries to Beat the House with Suit
Against Strip Casino, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 26, 1997, at 2D; John L. Smith, Casino's
Signature Leaves the Wall Streeters Whining, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 28, 1997, at lB.
18. See Casino's Wall Street Draws Lawsuit, supra note 12, at 3.
19. See id.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1994). See also American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996); I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d
127, 129 (D. Mass. 1998), vacated in part by 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting the history
and protection of the Lanham Act prior to the dilution amendment).
21. See American Express Co., 947 F. Supp. at 314; see LP. Lund Trading, 11 F. Supp.
2d at 129.
22. See Dominic Bencivenga, Trademark Dilution New Law Extends Protection of
Famous Marks, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1996, at 5.
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These states' trademark laws prohibit the use of a trademark in a
way that might dilute the trademark, regardless of the likelihood of
confusion.23 The federal government extended federal trademark
protection, similar to state laws, to prohibit dilution with the
passage of the FTDA.2n
B. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
In January 1996, the FITDA was signed by President Clinton
as an amendment to the Lanham Act.25 Under the FrDA,
dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services., 26 Unlike the
previous trademark protection, dilution protection is available for
famous marks even if there is no competition between the products
and no likelihood of confusion.27 The FTDA "protects famous
trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of
the mark or tarnish or disparage [the mark]."' Blurring occurs
when a use of the trademark might diminish the recognition of the
trademark owner's unique product.29 Tarnishment involves the
association of a famous trademark with an inferior product.3"
One purpose of the Dilution Act was to provide protection for
U.S. trademarks in overseas markets.3' The GATT Agreement
includes a provision designed to protect famous marks.32 Foreign
countries were reluctant to change their laws to protect U.S. marks
unless the U.S. provided similar protection.33 The FTDA assists
the executive branch in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with
23. See American Express Co., 947 F. Supp. at 314.
24. See President Signs Hatch Trademark Bill into Law, GOV'T PRESS RELEASE, Jan.
18, 1998, 1996 WL 5167042.
25. See id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1997).
27. Id.
28. See President Signs Hatch Trademark Bill into Law, supra note 25, at 1996 WL
5167042.
29. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
to Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp. 937 F.
Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
30. See id.
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other countries for greater protection of famous marks owned by
U.S. companies. 34
Another reason for the enactment of the FTDA was to
prevent forum shopping into states with dilution protection.35
Trademark owners who wanted to stop a non-competitor from
using their mark would try to obtain jurisdiction in states with
dilution statutes.
36
Famous trademarks are not specifically or narrowly defined
in the FTDA. The FTDA includes eight indicators of a famous
mark: the length of time the mark has been used; the distinctive-
ness of the mark; the geographic marketing area; the advertising
and publicity of the mark; the channels of trade; the degree of
recognition of the mark in the trademark owner's market and the
user's market; the extent of use of similar marks by third parties;
and whether the mark is registered.37 The eight factors are not
the exclusive methods for determining if a mark is famous.38
Injunctive relief is the primary remedy under the FTDA.3 9
However, if the court finds the user of the famous mark willfully
intended to "trade on the owner's reputation or ... cause dilu-
tion,"40 the user may also be subject to damages4' and possibly
be ordered to deliver the diluting materials for destruction.42
Under the FTDA a trademark owner must show:
(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commer-
cial use of the mark; (3) the defendant's use began after the
mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark
dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of
the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services
43
34. See id.
35. See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997).
38. See id.
39. See id. § 1125(c)(2) (1994).
40. Id.
41. See id. § 1117(a) (1994).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1994).
43. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324; see also 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997).
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The FTDA protects designs, names, looks and colors; essentially
anything that can be trademarked.' It is the FTDA's protection
potential that creates a cause of action for famous buildings.
C. Initial FTDA Cases
The initial FTDA cases appeared to fit the parameters of the
legislature's intent.45  Anheuser-Busch filed a claim against a t-
shirt manufacturer alleging dilution and requesting a temporary
restraining order.46 Anheuser-Busch claimed that the manufactur-
er was diluting the "Budweiser" trademark by producing a t-shirt
with the word "Buttwiser."'47 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California agreed with Anheuser-Busch.48
The California District Court was satisfied that Anheuser-Busch's
"Budweiser" trademark was famous and the use by the t-shirt
manufacturer could dilute Anheuser's famous trademark. 49  A
temporary restraining order was granted in favor of Anheuser.5 °
In another initial FTDA case, American Express sought to
prohibit CFK, Inc. from using a variation of American Express'
famous "Don't Leave Home Without It" trademark."1 CFK
produced a pocket address book and registered the product
trademark as the "Don't Leave Home Without Me Pocket Address
Book."52 American Express claimed that the CFK address book
would dilute the distinctive quality of American Express' "Don't
Leave Home Without [It, Them or Us]" marks.53 The Eastern
District Court of Michigan determined that there were genuine
44. See Federal Law Protects Famous Trademarks, JEWELERS CIRCULAR KEYSTONE,
April 1, 1996, at 209.
45. See 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10, S19310 (Dec. 29, 1995) Statement of Sen. Hatch
commenting that "the use of DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin and Kodak pianos would be
actionable under the bill". Id. at S19310. This reference indicates that the FTDA was
enacted to prohibit the use of famous trademark names on another product. Sen. Hatch's
comment reinforces the GATF reason for the FTDA because U.S. companies did not want
their U.S. trademark names associated with other products in other countries to preclude
U.S. companies from using their trademark name on their products.
46. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d,(BNA) 1542,





51. See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 313.
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issues of material fact and denied American Express' motion for
summary judgment.54 Although there was no injunction awarded
in the American Express case, the American Express case and the
Anheuser-Busch case seemed to represent the ideal sought to be
protected by the FTDA.55
In light of the initial FTDA claims and Congressional intent,
the dilution of building trademarks does not seem to coincide with
the purpose of the FTDA.5 6 However, in spite of that proposi-
tion, the current claims by building owners appear wholly based on
the FTDA and case law since the enactment of the FTDA.
III. Historical Development of Building Trademark Protection
A. Trade Dress Under the Lanham Act
Trademark protection for distinctive buildings can be traced
back to a 1937 Sixth Circuit decision regarding the White Castle
chain of hamburger stands. 7 White Castle began in 1921 with a
fast-food restaurant in Wichita, Kansas.5" In 1926, a party im-
pressed with the success of White Castle began a similar fast-food
business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin using the name White Tower.59
The case arose when White Castle and White Tower both expand-
ed to the Detroit, Michigan area.' Both businesses' buildings
were white structures designed like miniature castles. 61  The
54. See id. at 310.
55. The case is similar to the FTDA introduction because a similar trademark is being
used on a different product. See also 141 CONG. REC. S19306, S19310 (Dec. 29, 1995).
Statement of Sen. Hatch commenting that "the use of DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin and
Kodak pianos would be actionable under the bill." Id. This reference indicates that the
FTDA was enacted to prohibit the use of famous trademark names on different products.
56. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. See White Tower Sys. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 67
(6th Cir. 1937); see also Joseph R. Dreitler, Is Sixth Circuit Off Key?, NAT'L L.J., May 18,
1998, at C25 (stating that the reversal of preliminary injunction in the Rock and Roll Hall
of Fame case (134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998) "ignored 6th Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent and ... the Lanham Act").






businesses' names and slogans were similar.62 The parties conced-
ed that confusion was going to be a problem.63
The court determined that White Tower specifically tried to
create a business similar to White Castle.' White Tower took
photographs and obtained plans and specifications to copy White
Castle's building design.6' Additionally, White Tower hired a
White Castle employee at four times his salary in exchange for the
employee providing information about White Castle.'
The Sixth Circuit determined that if White Tower, the junior
user, moved into a market where White Castle could reasonably be
expected to operate, the use could be enjoined.67 The general
rule applied by the Sixth Circuit was "that priority of adoption of
a trade name or distinctive feature gives [the] exclusive right
to ... use."'  The Sixth Circuit also stated that White Castle had
the exclusive right to the building style.69
The right to a building style was also explored in Two Pesos
v. Taco Cabana.7" Prior to the Two Pesos decision, trade dress
was protected by the Lanham Act when the trade dress was
inherently distinctive and had acquired secondary meaning. In Two
Pesos, the United States Supreme Court tackled the issue of
whether restaurant trade dress was protected by the Lanham Act
if the trade dress was determined to be inherently distinctive, but
there was no proof of secondary meaning.71
Taco Cabana opened their first fast-food restaurant in San
Antonio, Texas in September 1985.72 The trade dress of the
restaurant included a festive, brightly-colored interior and unusually
designed exterior of the building.73 Two Pesos opened a restau-
62. See id. White Castle's slogan was "Buy 'Em By the Sack" and White Tower's slogan
was "Take Home a Bagful," the restaurant names were obviously similar. White Tower Sys.,




66. See id. The former White Castle employee provided information ranging from
White Castle's griddle metals to its accounting forms. See White Tower Sys., 90 F.2d at 68.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 69.
69. See id.
70. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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rant in December 1985 with a trade dress similar to Taco Ca-
bana's.74 In 1986, Two Pesos entered Dallas and El Paso where
Taco Cabana already had restaurants.75 Taco Cabana brought a
trade dress infringement action against Two Pesos.
7 6
The District Court and Fifth Circuit determined that trade
dress was protected under the Lanham Act if the trade dress was
distinctive or if the trade dress had acquired secondary meaning.
77
Based on the determination, the District and Fifth Circuit Courts
held that Taco Cabana's trade dress was inherently distinctive and
protected.78 Two Pesos appealed based on the argument that if
secondary meaning was not present, inherent distinctiveness could
not be found.79 The United States Supreme Court held that trade
dress was protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act if it was
inherently distinctive without a showing of secondary meaning.8'
Although the holding dealt with elements to prove entitlement to
trade dress protection, the Two Pesos decision supports the
proposition that an inherently distinctive building design is
protected by trademark law as trade dress.
While the White Castle and Taco Cabana cases speak to the
right of the company to have the exclusive right to the particular
building design, they do not cover the right to control the photo-
graphic representations of the building.
B. Trade Dress and Dilution
The control of photographic representations was explored in
a recent building trademark case involving the Rock and Roll Hall
of Fame Museum in Cleveland, Ohio.8" The Museum was de-
signed by renowned architect I.M. Pei and has a state trademark
and pending federal trademark.' The Museum gift shop sells
posters of the building and other souvenirs.8 3 Charles Gentile, a
professional photographer, photographed the Museum, created a
74. See id.
75. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 766-67.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767.
81. See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prod., 134 F.3d 749,
749 (6th Cir. 1998).
82. See id. at 751.
83. See id. at 752.
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poster of the photograph and began selling the poster.84 The
Museum requested a preliminary injunction alleging Gentile's
pictures amounted to federal dilution, unfair competition and
infringement.85 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio granted the Museum's injunction request and ordered
Gentile to stop sales and turn over the posters to the Museum for
destruction.86  Gentile appealed the District Court's decision to
grant the injunction.87
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary
injunction.88 The Sixth Circuit determined the Museum did not
meet the burden of proving a likelihood of success on the merits
and that the Museum's building was not "an indicator of source or
sponsorship."89  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit decided that the
Museum did not present enough evidence to prevail on the merits
because of its inconsistent irregular use of the building design.9 °
While the Sixth Circuit decision may seem to stand as an
indication that courts are not amenable to actions regarding
building trademarks, dicta in the case indicates the opposite. The
dilution claim was not discussed in detail, but dicta indicated that
evidence of "public recognition of the Museum's building design as
a trademark ... might be pivotal."91
Furthermore, the majority of the Sixth Circuit agreed that a
picture of a Coke bottle (which is a trademarked design) would be
an infringing use, but concluded that the Museum did not use its
building design as a trademark.92 Chief Judge Martin, in his
dissent, did not find any difference between the picture of the
Museum and a picture of a trademarked Coke bottle.93 Martin's
84. See id. at 751.
85. See id. The Museum stated the motion was only regarding trademark infringement
violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc., 134
F.3d at 751.
86. See id. at 752-53.
87. See id. at 753.
88. See id. at 750.
89. Id. at 754.
90. See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc., 134 F.3d at 755. Because a
specific angle of representation was not consistently used the court determined that the
Museum's use was not a trademark. See id.
91. See id. at 754. The Sixth Circuit's comment that public recognition could be a
pivotal fact may refer to the dilution of a famous trademark. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc., 134 F.3d at 756-57 (Martin, B.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 103:4
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dissent centered on a U.S. Supreme Court definition of a trade-
mark as a "distinguishable token'devised or picked out with the
intent to appropriate [the token] to a particular class of goods with
the hope that it will come to symbolize good will."94  Martin
concluded that the Museum was designed to create instant
recognition, and the trademark protects sales of reproductions of
the instant recognition. 95
While the majority in the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame case
agreed that the Museum had not gained the notoriety of a Coke
bottle, the opposite would likely be found for well-known marks
such as the Chrysler Building and the NYSE. Unlike the Rock and
Roll Hall of Fame Museum building, the Chrysler Building and
NYSE are readily recognizable by most people.
Moreover, the owners of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame
building trademark were not concerned with the reproduction of
the building in the skyline; rather, they were concerned about a
picture of the building alone.96 However, simply because the
Museum did not raise the issue of using the building in the skyline
does not mean that such a claim would be unfounded. The Rock
and Roll Hall of Fame decision seems to rest on the court's
interpretation that when the court viewed the photograph taken by
Gentile they did "not readily recognize the Museum's building as
an indicator of source or sponsorship."'  The case appears to turn
on the fact that the public did not recognize the building as a
trademark.98 This decision leaves the door open for claims by
owners of buildings who use their buildings as trademarks, and
creates incentive for building owners to begin using their distinctive
buildings as trademarks.99
94. Id. at 756 (Martin, B., dissenting).
95. See id. at 758-59 (Martin, B., dissenting).
96. See id. at 754.
97. Id.
98. See Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc., 134 F.3d at 754.
99. See Steven B. Pokotilow and Matthew W. Siegal, Policing Non-Identical Uses of TMs
on Unrelated Goods, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, November, 1996, at *6.
1999]
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IV. Trade Dress and the FTDA
A. Trade Dress is Protected by the FTDA
Two Pesos stands for the proposition that building design may
be protected as trade dress."°  Recently, one court took trade
dress protection a step further and held that FTDA protection
extends to trade dress. 1 On a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
determined that the FTDA applied to trade dress.'" Sunbeam
and West Bend both produced stand mixers.10 3 Sunbeam alleged
that its stand mixer was infringed by West Bend's recent de-
sign." The "American Classic" mixer was advertised by Sun-
beam for more than sixty years and no other producer had a
similar model. 5 In 1995, West Bend began development of a
stand mixer to add to its array of products."° The evidence at
trial established that West Bend included a copy of the Sunbeam
stand mixer when the West Bend model went to production. 7
Initially, the District Court evaluated whether Sunbeam was
eligible for trade dress protection of the stand mixer by applying
the Two Pesos definition of trade dress.10 8 The District Court
determined that Sunbeam met the necessary standards for trade
dress protection.19 A preliminary injunction was granted based
on trade dress infringement. 0
100. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1, 765 (1992). The
instructions to the jury in the District Court and the description of Taco Cabana's trade dress
included a the building's exterior. See id.
101. See Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554 (S.D. Miss.
1996), affd, 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1795 (1998).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1547-48.
104. See id. at 1546-48.
105. See id. at 1547.
106. See Sunbeam Prod., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547-48.
107. See id. at 1547.
108. See id. at 1548. The District Court defined trade dress as "involv[ing] the total
image of a product." Id. (citing to Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765
n.1 (1992)).
109. See id. at 1550-54. The District Court determined that Sunbeam's stand mixer was
not functional, the design was inherently distinctive and there was a likelihood of confusion.
See Sunbeam Prod., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550-54. Sunbeam's stand mixer qualified for
trade dress protection because the three factors were met, in spite of the fact that Sunbeam
did not have a registered mark for the stand mixer. See id.
110. See id. at 1547. The District Court concluded that Sunbeam (1) had a substantial
likelihood of succeeding on the merits, (2) offered sufficient evidence of a irreparable injury
[Vol. 103:4
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In addition, the trade dress dilution claim under the FTDA
was discussed."' In order to award an injunction based on
dilution, the District Court stated that (1) Sunbeam must have a
famous mark, (2) West Bend's use of the famous mark must have
begun after Sunbeam's mark was famous, and (3) the use by West
Bend must cause dilution of Sunbeam's mark." 2  The District
Court determined that Sunbeam's stand mixer was a famous
mark" 3 and West Bend was trying to make commercial use of the
mark."4  The foregoing reasoning led the District Court to
conclude that a preliminary injunction was warranted based on the
dilution claim."
15
B. FTDA Has Retroactive Application For Continuing Conduct
The United States Supreme Court recognizes a presumption
against applying statutes to conduct which arose before the statutes'
enactment, unless the statute specifically allows such applica-
tion.116 Such a presumption would probably preclude the allega-
tion by the owners of the Chrysler Building because souvenirs of
the building have been on the market since before the enactment
of the FTDA. However, a recent case interpreted the FTDA to
apply to conduct that was legal before the enactment of the
if West Bend continued production of the competing stand mixer, (3) proved that the threat
of injury to Sunbeam was greater than the harm that West Bend would suffer as a result of
the injunction, and (4) proved that the issuance of the preliminary injunction would not be
a public disservice. See id. at 1554.
111. See id. at 1555.
112. See Sunbeam Prod., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
113. See id. at 1555. The District Court did not review each of the individual factors to
be considered for determination of a famous mark, but referred to the findings during the
infringement phase that would support a decision that Sunbeam's mark was famous. See id.
Such findings would include the extensive advertising of the mark, the lack of stand mixers
on the market that resemble the Sunbeam stand mixer, and the fact that the copied stand
mixer accounts for seventy percent of Sunbeam's mixer sales. See id. at 1547-48.
Additionally, the District Court relied on the fact that Sunbeam had applied for a trademark
for the overall shape and configuration of the Sunbeam stand mixer. See id. at 1555.
114. See Sunbeam Prod., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (noting that the West Bend mixer
would be sold next to the Sunbeam mixer at a lower cost).
115. See id. at 1555. The District Court did not discuss the potential claim for damages
regarding the dilution claim because a determination of willful dilution was a matter for the
trial court. See id.
116. See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enter., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 887 (8th Cir. 1998), (citing to
Langraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 278 (1994)).
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FTDA.i t7 If pre-FTDA conduct continues but is illegal pursuant
to the FTDA, the conduct is actionable under the FTDA."8
In Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a District Court decision denying the extension of federal
dilution protection for actions which occurred before the FTDA
was passed." 9 Viacom is the owner of many registered trade-
marks for a variety of consumer products and services centered
around the words "Blockbuster" and "Blockbuster Video."'
' 20
Most notable are the Blockbuster Video and Blockbuster Music
franchises across the country.121  Ingram owns "Blockbuster" as
a registered trademark for firework sales at stands in Missouri and
California. 122 The District Court stated that because Ingram's use
"did not violate federal law when initiated, it would be 'manifestly
inequitable' 123 to compel [Ingram] to surrender good will associat-
ed with [his] competing" Blockbuster mark for firework sales.124
The Eight Circuit did not agree with the District Court
reasoning.125  While the Eight Circuit Court recognized that the
FTDA did not expressly address retroactivity, the Court was
persuaded by Viacom's argument that the statute may apply to
prospective conduct.1
26
The Eighth Circuit determined that prospective relief may be
applied without violating the traditional presumption against
retroactivity.12' By defining the conduct to be enjoined as con-
duct that continued after the passage of the FTDA, the Eighth
Circuit determined that the FTDA could be used for injunctive
relief even if the conduct began before the passage of the
FrFDA. 2 ' Although the Eighth Circuit appeal was interlocutory
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 888.
120. See id. at 887. "[S]ome of, Blockbuster's registered marks are ... incontestible under
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994)." Viacom, Inc., 141 F.3d at 887.
121. See id. at 888.
122. See id. Ingram's mark was federally registered in 1992 and Ingram has a registration
pending for "Blockbuster Fireworks." See id.
123. See id. at 889 (citing to Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. OfficeMax,. Inc. 949 F. Supp. 409,
419 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
124. Viacom, Inc., 141 F.3d at 889
125. See id.
126. See id. at 888-89.
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and therefore not a final decision,129 the case nonetheless stands
for the proposition that FTDA claims may enjoin continuing
dilution 3 ' at the discretion of the court.'31
V. Analysis of Viability of FTDA Action For a Building Trade-
mark
"[I]f a configuration of a product is subject to registration
under trademark law, it is subject to being protected under trade
dress." '132 Both the Chrysler Building and the NYSE are regis-
tered trademarks.'33 Therefore the buildings are subject to trade
dress protection,"' and that trade dress protection now includes
the protection against dilution under the FTDA. 3'
In order for the owners of the NYSE or the Chrysler Building
to prevail on the claim of dilution, they must meet the elements
required by the FTDA.136 In the initial FTDA cases, the plaintiff
had to prove that its mark was famous and the defendant's use of
129. See Viacom, Inc., 141 F.3d at 890.
130. See Dilution Act Applies to Marks Registered Before Enactment, 8th Circuit Rules,
6 No. 16 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP. 3, May 18, 1998; Intellectual Property Court
Watch, Roundup of Recent Developments, 4 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 9 (June, 1998);
Federal Dilution Act Applies Retroactively to Continuing Conduct, 10 No. 6 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 14 (June, 1998).
131. See Viacom, Inc., 141 F.3d at 890. The Eighth Circuit relied on the wording of the
FTDA which provides "injunctive relief is subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equity." See id. (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997)). If the
injunction would harm the junior user's valuable and legitimate property interest in the
trademark the court may decide not to issue the injunction. See id.
132. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, at 1549 (S.D. Miss.
1996).
133. The NYSE is registered for the name "New York Stock Exchange" as well as the
building facade. Registration Number 1761655 filed on June 15, 1990. The primary class of
goods for the NYSE is "insurance, banking and financial services." The spire of the Chrysler
Building is currently registered under Registration Number 1126888 filed on May 17, 1978.
The Chrysler Building's primary service is listed as "leasing office space and attendant
services to tenants." The owner of the Chrysler Building has also applied for trademark
registration for the whole building along with 400 different goods and services. See Dunlap,
The Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
134. Additionally, the Two Pesos case stands for the proposition that trade dress protec-
tion can include the exterior design of a building. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1, 765 (1992).
135. See Sunbeam Prod., Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555; see also Paul Heald,
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the
Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configuration, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 418-19 (1998).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,
141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the famous mark diluted the mark.137 More recently, FTDA
claims have included more elements.1 38  Specifically, the claimant
seeking the injunction must show the mark is famous; the alleged
diluter is making a commercial use of the famous mark; the use
began after the mark became famous; and the capacity to identify
the mark owner's goods and services has been diluted. 139  Each
element will be discussed individually.
A. Is the Trademark Famous?
There is not a vast amount of case law on federal trademark
dilution. While the FVJDA does not contain a definition of what
constitutes "famous," the FTDA does contain factors to consider
in order to determine if the trademark is famous, the factors are
not the exclusive factors that may be used.14 ° Some courts have
quickly concluded the mark is famous with little reasoning to
support their decision;14 ' other courts have determined that if the
mark is distinctive the mark is famous. 42 Still other courts have
137. See Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf dlb/a Haha, 1996 WL 460083, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid,
116 F.3d 471 (3rd Cir. 1997). The District Court's discussion included a determination of
whether Wawa's mark was famous and whether the defendant's use diluted Wawa's mark.
See id; see also American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
138. See Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1324. This case involved the sale of a trade-
name as an internet domain name which is a growing area of FTDA claims. While the issue
of this article does not involve the internet, the elements of the FTDA claim in the
Panavision Int'l case represent a more current interpretation of the FTDA than the cases
which looked at only two elements. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at
1324.
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (Supp. 1997).
141. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp.,
937 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that Ringling has owned the trademark since
1961 and therefore the mark is entitled to protection against dilution); see also Sara Lee
Corp. v. American Leather Products, Inc., 1998 WL 433764, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1998).
The court listed the FTDA factors and concluded the registered trademark of the Coach
hang tag was a famous mark but noting the registration of the tag was the only analysis of
why the mark was famous. See id. at *11.
142. See Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(recognizing the eight FTDA factors to determine a famous mark then concluding that since
the court determined the mark was distinctive, it was therefore famous); see also Films of
Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Productions, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
The court, in Films of Distinction, notes "[t]rademark dilution laws protect 'distinctive' OR
'famous' trademarks from certain unauthorized uses," and lists the non exclusive FTDA
factors to determine famous marks; although there is no in depth analysis because the
decision is in regards to a motion to dismiss. (emphasis added) See Films of Distinction, 12
F. Supp. 2d at 1078-79. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (Supp. 1997) (The FTDA factors are
to determine "whether a mark is distinctive AND famous" because the FTDA protects a
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completed a more in-depth analysis of whether the mark is famous
by determining which of the FTDA factors the mark meets.
1 43
If a court applied the simple standard and quickly determined
whether a mark was famous, the court could probably quickly
conclude that the NYSE and Chrysler Building were famous
marks.144 The instant conclusion would be based on general
knowledge that the NYSE and the Chrysler Building are well-
known landmarks in New York City. Their unique shapes are
recognizable even in a silhouette of the New York skyline.
If the next higher standard were applied, where courts
determined that if the mark is distinctive then the mark is famous,
the NYSE and Chrysler Building would probably also be consid-
ered famous under that standard.1 45  Trade dress protection is
extended to designs that are inherently distinctive.'" The Chrys-
ler Building and NYSE are marks registered to protect the
distinctive trade dress of their buildings. However, other courts
have noted that simply because the trademarks are distinctive does
not mean that they are famous.147
Application of the most stringent standard, the FTDA
indicators, would probably still lead to the conclusion that the
Chrysler Building and NYSE are famous marks. The Chrysler
Building spire is trademarked with a trademark pending for the
entire building.'" The Chrysler Building trademark has been in
famous mark from "dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.") (emphasis added). A
court interpretation that a mark is entitled to dilution protection if the mark is distinctive or
famous rather than distinctive and famous seems to extend the FTDA to protect famous
marks which may not be distinctive or distinctive marks which may not be famous.
143. See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310,314-15 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf d/b/a Haha, 1996 WL 460083, at *1 - *2 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d
471 (3rd Cir. 1997) (noting that Wawa has a famous mark because Wawa has a strong mark,
the mark has been used for over 90 years, the public recognizes the mark, and the mark has
been extensively advertised).
144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. The NYSE and the Chrysler Building
are distinctive and well-known landmarks in New York City and across the country. A court
could easily categorize the buildings as famous.
145. Trade dress requires distinctiveness. See Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. West Bend Co.,
1996 WL 511639, at *6 (S.D. Miss. 1996). Building design is entitled to trademark protection
as trade dress. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1992).
146. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 776.
147. See Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enter., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 890 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
to 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:91, at 24-149 (4th Ed.
1997)).
148. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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use for more than twenty years. 14  Additionally, the Chrysler
Building is a distinctive building recognized by most people in this
country and internationally as a New York landmark. The current
market for the Chrysler Building is upscale rental space.5 ° The
pending trademark registration includes a service of providing over
400 products associated with the Chrysler Building which would
expand the market to the tourist industry of New York City. 5'
Since the Chrysler Building meets many of the famous indicators,
the court would probably find that the Chrysler Building serves as
a famous mark.52
The NYSE is known nationally and internationally as a
provider of financial services. The NYSE has been in use for over
90 years.153 While the registered name "New York Stock Ex-
change" has national and international recognition, the building
facade may not be as well-known. However, the facade is probably
at least known nationally. Since the NYSE meets many of the
"famous indicators," it would probably be determined to be famous
for purposes of the FTDA.
15 4
B. Is the Defendant Making a Commercial Use of the Mark?
The FTDA provides an injunction for the "commercial use in
commerce of a [famous] mark or trade name.' 1 55  "[I]n com-
merce" is defined as "commerce which may be lawfully regulated
by Congress.,
156
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court found a commercial use by
the plaintiff trading on the value of the famous mark. 57 Since
the NYSE and the Chrysler Building are registered trademarks, the
sale of a reproduction of the trademark would likely count as a
commercial use. Sales of souvenirs of both the Chrysler Building
and NYSE would likely qualify as commercial purposes. Addition-
149. See Trademark Registration No. 1126888, Registration Date Nov. 20, 1979; with a
first use date of March 22, 1978.
150. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 6-7 and accompanying text.
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (F) & (H) (Supp. 1997).
153. See Trademark Registration No. 1761655, Registration Date June 15, 1990; with a
first use date of April 22, 1903.
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (H) (Supp. 1997).
155. See id. § (c)(1).
156. See id. § 1127.
157. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998).
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ally, the use of the buildings on postcards or posters for sale may
also be considered commercial uses.
For the purposes of this section, the specific uses of the
buildings in the current issues will be discussed. Proving defen-
dant's use of the building trademarks for commercial use would not
be a difficult hurdle for the owners of the Chrysler Building and
the NYSE.
The use of the Chrysler Building in a china pattern for sale to
the general public would qualify as a commercial purpose because
the china producers are profiting from the sales. The china pattern
also appears on a web site for Fishs Eddy where site visitors can
call the store to order the china.158 The internet commercializa-
tion of the plate creates a national market for the china boutique.
"New York New York's" use of the NYSE facade and the
designation of an area as "New York $lot Exchange" could be
considered a commercial purpose because of its potential to draw
people into the casino.159
C. Did Defendant's Use Begin After the Trademark Became
Famous?
There is no determining factor for when a mark becomes
famous. Logically, it does not make much sense for someone to
use a trademark which is not famous because that would severely
limit the marketing appeal. People will buy products and services
that are associated with famous marks because they recognize the
mark.
There is no doubt that the NYSE was famous before the use
of the trademark by "New York New York" because the Casino
was recently built. It is likely the use by Fishs Eddy began after
the Chrysler Building became famous because the fame of the
building is probably one of the reasons for the trademark usage.
The issue of using the mark after it became famous may not
be as dispositive for the owners of the Chrysler Building as the
issue of whether the statute could apply to conduct that began
before the dilution protection existed. The Chrysler Building may
have had problems obtaining dilution protection prior to the
Viacom decision because of the presumption against retroactive
158. See <http://newyork.citysearch.comJE/V/NYCNY/0001 /15/06>. The (212) Pattern
is the china pattern which contains the New York skyline.
159. See Dunlap, The Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
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application of new statutes.1 ° The Viacom decision, extending
dilution protection to continuing behavior, increases the probability
that the Chrysler Building owners may have trademark dilution
protection from the sale of items containing building representa-
tions, provided the sales continue after passage of the FTDA.
D. Does Defendant's Use Dilute the Capacity of the Trademark
to Identify and Distinguish Goods and Services?
Dilution occurs when the contested use causes blurring or
tarnishment. 16' Blurring is use of the trademark in a manner that
confuses consumers as to the origin of the product.162 Tarnish-
ment occurs when the use lessens the quality of the trademark. 63
A third type of dilution, known as diminishment, has been crafted
by the courts. 64 Diminishment occurs when the trademark is
portrayed in a manner where the consumers may "attribute
unfavorable characteristics to the mark and ultimately associate the
mark with inferior goods.
1 65
The Chrysler Building would probably have a claim for
tarnishment or diminishment. The Chrysler Building caters to
tenants desiring high-proffle rental space."6 In order to win on
the tarnishment claim, the owners of the Chrysler Building would
have to show that the reproduction of the building in the china
160. See discussion supra Part IV. B.
161. See President Signs Hatch Trademark Bill into Law, supra note 25, at 1996 WL
5167042.
162. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
to Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 937 F.
Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
163. See id.
164. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43-45 (2nd Cir. 1994). While
Deere & Co. was a N.Y. state statute dilution claim and decided prior to the FTDA, the case
has been cited with approval in Leslie Fay v. Nipon, 216 B.R. 117, 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1997) and Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd,
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). Since the N.Y. and FTDA dilution statutes contain almost
identical language and the FTDA does not have extensive interpretative precedent, courts
have been borrowing from N.Y. precedent for guidance in interpreting the FTDA. See
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp.
204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating the analysis of dilution under N.Y. and FTDA are the
same); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1304. But see I.P. Lund Trading v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting the application of the blurring factors
used for the N.Y. anti-dilution statute because the factors are part of "classical likelihood of
confusion analysis").
165. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 45.
166. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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pattern associates the building with "shoddy goods or services" 167
which may "evoke unflattering thoughts about"' 68 the Chrysler
Building's rental space. A representative for the owners of the
Chrysler Building described the owner's duty as ensuring the
integrity of the building. 69 Guarding the integrity of the building
includes making sure that "shoddy merchandise" is not associated
with the building.7 °
A diminishment claim would require a showing that the
alteration of the building in the china pattern skyline will lessen the
appeal of the rental space to patrons and potential tenants of the
Chrysler Building.171  The statement by the Chrysler Building
owner's representative that the building on Fishs Eddy's china
pattern was not an adequate representation of the Chrysler
Building trademark indicates that a tarnishment or diminishment
claim was being pursued.172 Chrysler Building owners would have
to come forth with proof of how the building trademark and their
business have been tarnished or diminished because of the
reproduction.
The NYSE probably would have a claim under dilution by
blurring and tarnishment. Patrons to "New York New York"
Casino may believe that the NYSE has sponsored the Casino
because of the use of the Exchange's trademarks.173 Such a belief
on the part of patrons could constitute a claim of blurring.
174
Some courts have followed the analysis used by New York Federal
Courts to determine whether there has been a proper claim for
dilution by blurring.175 The blurring factors from New York cases
167. Clinique Lab., Inc., 945 F. Supp. at 562 (citing to Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Prod., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2nd Cir. 1996) and Deere & Co., Inc., 41 F.3d at 43).
168. Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 43.
169. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2, at 11.
170. See id.
171. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 45; see also Robert P. Lane, Jr. and Lynne Sims-Taynor,
Famous Trademarks Protected Under New Federal Law, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J., March 18, 1996,
at 1.
172. See Dunlap, The Skyline, supra note 2, at El.
173. See Exchange of Views, supra note 12, at 13; NYSE Tries to Beat the House with Suit
Against Strip Casino, supra note 17, at 2D; see also Smith, supra note 17, at lB.
174. See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(discussing the factors for blurring).
175. See Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
also American Express Co., Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 316-17. But see I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler




include the similarity of the marks and products covered by the
marks, sophistication of the consumers, and renown of the senior
and junior mark.176
A determination of blurring by the factors involves a balancing
approach.177 "New York New York" is using the building facade
of the NYSE and the phrase "New York $lot Exchange." '178 The
facade and the terms "New York Stock Exchange" are registered
on the principal register.79 Obviously there is a similarity of
marks between the ones used by "New York New York" and the
NYSE registered marks.8 ' The products of the Casino and
NYSE are similar, both deal with financial matters and provide a
method of making money. NYSE easily wins the balance as a
more well-known mark because the mark has been around since
the early 1900s 81 and caters to an international market. Al-
though patrons of the NYSE may not think the NYSE would run
a casino, patrons of the Casino may believe the Casino is backed
by the NYSE due to the use of the NYSE marks.'82 The NYSE
would have a valid blurring claim.
A dilution by tarnishment claim may be available for the
NYSE. The NYSE would have to prove that the Casino's use of
their trademarks will cause "negative associations" with the
marks.183 The negative associations that may arise because of the
use of the NYSE trademarks are similar to those discussed with the
176. See Clinique Lab., 945 F. Supp. at 562-63 (noting that N.Y. dilution law requires
predatory intent but FTDA does not); American Express Co., 947 F. Supp. at 316-17; Wawa,
Inc. v. Haaf a/k/a Haha, Civ. A. No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083, at *3 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 116
F.3d 471 (3rd Cir. 1997). But see I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st
Cir. 1998) (rejecting the application of the blurring factors used for the N.Y. anti-dilution
statute because the factors are part of "classical likelihood of confusion analysis").
177. See Wawa, Inc., 1996 WL 460083, at *3 (describing the blurring determination as
balancing and tipping the scales in favor of one party or the other).
178. See NYSE Tries to Beat House with Suit Against Strip Casino, supra note 17, at 2D;
see also Casino's Wall Street Theme Draws Lawsuit, supra note 12, at 3.
179. See Trademark Registration No. 1761655, Registration Date March 30, 1993.
180. "New York New York" uses the New York Stock Exchange building facade and the
term "New York $lot Exchange." The NYSE has a registered trademark for both the
building facade and the words "New York Stock Exchange." See supra note 13-16 and
accompanying text.
181. See Trademark Registration No. 1761655, Registration Date March 30, 1993; with
a first use date of April 22, 1903.
182. See Exchange of Views, supra note 12, at 13; see also NYSE Tries to Beat the House
with Suit Against Strip Casino, supra note 17, at 2D; see also Smith, supra note 17, at lB.
183. Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing to
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2nd Cir. 1996)).
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blurring claim; namely, that people patronizing the Casino may
think that the NYSE has sponsored the Casino.184 As part of the
tarnishment claim, the NYSE may also argue that the association
of their trademarks with the Casino is an association -with unwhole-
some goods or services.185 The case filed by the NYSE indicates
tarnishment because of the description of the Casino's use of the
NYSE trademarks as "mutilating and bastardizing" NYSE's
trademarks.186
VI. Conclusion
Clearly, the potential for lawsuits involving the Chrysler
Building and the NYSE exist under the FTDA and case law.
While the Chrysler Building owners may have a more difficult time
in proving their claim, the foundation for the claim is present. A
decision in favor of NYSE in the pending case187 would solidify
the claim of the Chrysler Building owners that there is a protect-
able right in the building or building facade. That right could
extend to control of the use of the building in souvenirs and
postcards or other reproductions of the skyline.
Whether or not such protection was envisioned by Congress is
questionable. 88 In light of the fact that a cause of action proba-
bly exists, Congress may choose to change the FTDA to preclude
the protection, or allow the law to travel on its present course.
Current case law, explored above, is rapidly on its way to providing
the protection that the owners of the Chrysler Building and NYSE
trademarks are seeking to acquire. The case most similar to the
Chrysler Building and NYSE issues, the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame case, encourages owners of distinctive buildings to enforce
their trademark rights.
1 89
The Chrysler Building owners have already begun their
enforcement program with the claim against Fishs Eddy.19° The
184. See Exchange of Views, supra note 12, at 13; see also NYSE Tries to Beat the House
with Suit Against Strip Casino, supra note 17, at 2D; see also Smith, supra note 17, at lB.
185. See supra notes 167-168, 170-171 and accompanying text. The NYSE, like the
Chrysler Building, would also have to offer proof that their trademark was harmed or was
going to be harmed by an association with lower quality representation.
186. See Casino's Wall Street Theme Draws Lawsuit, supra note 12, at 3.
187. See New York Stock Exchange v. New York New York Hotel LLC, No. 97CV2859
(S.D.N.Y. filed April 21, 1997).
188. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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NYSE is also enforcing its right to control the use of its trade-
mark.191 The ramifications of these cases have not yet come to
fruition, although if the cases continue along the current path, it
will not be long before the skyline is owned by those whose
buildings create the appealing view.
Lucia Sitar
191. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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